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Changing Climate for Carbon Taxes 1
Introduction
Carbon taxes have recently become a major source of discussion in the Washington, DC policy community. Supporters contend that 
they offer an efficient way to simultaneously create 
incentives to emit less carbon dioxide and reduce 
the budget deficit.1 Leading think tanks from 
both the left and the right, including Brookings, 
the American Enterprise Institute, and Resources 
for the Future, have hosted dialogues on how to 
structure the tax and use the revenues. Meanwhile, 
lawmakers have proposed two carbon tax bills 
during this congressional session: 1) Senators Boxer 
(D-CA) and Sanders (I-VT) put forward a plan to 
assess coal, oil, and gas producers a $20-per-ton 
carbon tax2; and 2) Rep. Henry Waxman (D-CA), 
along with Rep. Blumenauer (D-OR) and Senators 
Whitehouse (D-RI) and Schatz (D-HI) released a 
discussion draft of a bill that would impose a fee 
of between $15 and $30 per ton on greenhouse gas 
emissions from power plants, factories, refineries, 
and other major emitters of carbon dioxide.3
Should such a carbon tax be enacted, it will in all 
likelihood be accompanied by measures to ensure 
that the U.S. industries that would be most heavily 
affected by the tax are not placed at a competitive 
disadvantage with respect to competitor producers 
operating in countries that have not imposed 
any restrictions or taxes on carbon usage. Any 
such efforts to “level the playing field” will raise 
numerous questions regarding their compatibility 
with U.S. international obligations, especially their 
1  A 2012 Congressional Research Study found, under one 
scenario, that a $20 per ton carbon tax, escalating by 5.6 percent 
annually, could cut the projected 10-year deficit by roughly 50 
percent (from $2.3 trillion down to $1.1 trillion). See “Carbon 
Tax: Deficit Reduction and Other Considerations,” CRS 7-5700, 
September 17, 2012.
2  The Climate Protection Act of 2013, S. 332, 113th Congress, 
February 15, 2009. 
3  Broder, John M. (March 12, 2013), “Lawmakers Release 
Carbon Emissions Tax Plan,” New York Times, http://thecaucus.
blogs.nytimes.com/2013/03/12/representatives-release-carbon-
emissions-tax-plan/. 
legality under agreed upon rules of the World Trade 
Organization (WTO) and in particular, the General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT).4
Can such a carbon tax be applied in a way that 
does not violate U.S. obligations under the WTO 
Agreements?5 I believe the answer is yes, provided 
that policymakers carefully design such a tax, 
keeping in mind the basic requirements of the 
WTO not to discriminate in favor of domestic 
producers or to favor imports from certain coun-
tries over others. The key is to structure any accom-
panying border measure as a straightforward exten-
sion of the domestic climate policy to imports. If so 
designed, there should be few questions about the 
measure’s consistency with the WTO rules. Even if 
questions were raised, the United States would have 
strong defenses within the WTO system. And even 
if those defenses were somehow to fail, the United 
States would be able to make adjustments should 
some aspect of its carbon tax system be found 
wanting. A non-discriminatory tax enacted in good 
faith to address climate change should pass muster 
with the WTO. Therefore, the threat of WTO 
challenges should not deter policymakers from 
adopting a carbon tax system now.
4  While a number of carbon reduction schemes, including a cap-
and-trade or emissions trading system, could raise issues under 
various parts of the WTO Agreement, including in particular 
the Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade, this paper focuses 
on the rules that would be applicable to a tax (i.e., a compulsory 
contribution imposed by the government for which taxpayers 
receive nothing identifiable in return). It is presumed that the 
main base of such a “carbon tax” would be the carbon dioxide 
emissions of fossil fuels, with the amount of the tax and its 
method of calculation to be determined by policymakers. 
5  An extensive body of literature has been created on the 
intersection between climate change policies and international 
trade rules. A thorough bibliography of that literature can 
be found in many of the works cited in this paper, including 
WTO-UNEP Report (2009), Trade and Climate Change, www.
wto.org; Hufbauer, G., Charnovitz, S., and Kim, J. (2009), Global 
Warming and the World Trading System, Peterson Institute 
for International Economics, Washington DC.; and Houser, 
T. Bradley, R., Childs, B., Werksman, J., Heilmayr, R. (2008), 
Leveling the Carbon Playing Field: International Competition and 
U.S. Climate Policy Design, Peterson Institute for International 
Economics and World Resources Institute, Washington DC. 
The key is to structure 
any accompanying 
border measure as 
a straightforward 
extension of the 
domestic climate policy 
to imports.
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The Simple Path1
Complications only arise 
should policymakers 
choose to go beyond 
a tax applied to any or 
all domestic producers 
or users of carbon and 
tax or place restrictions 
on foreign goods or 
companies.
Carbon Tax on U.S. Production  
and Use of Fossil Fuels 
The United States, like all sovereign nations, is free to adopt any tax system or policy it chooses, including any that would tax the 
generation of power, the production of fossil fuels, 
and/or the major users of such power or fuels, 
with the amount of the tax being calibrated to 
the volume of carbon dioxide emitted in either 
the production or the burning of those fuels or 
the generation of power. If the United States were 
simply to impose its own carbon tax on U.S. power 
producers and/or U.S. producers of coal, oil, gaso-
line, natural gas, or other fuels, and even to extend 
it to all domestic users of fossil fuels or the power 
generated using those fossil fuels, there would be 
no potential for international trade law violations. 
Indeed, policymakers are free to structure such 
a domestic carbon tax as they see fit, including 
the initial amount of the tax; any change in the 
tax amount over time; and any methodology for 
assessing how much, if any, producers of down-
stream products such as aluminum, cement, steel, 
paper, chemicals, and other energy intensive indus-
tries would pay.6 Complications only arise should 
policymakers choose to go beyond a tax applied to 
any or all domestic producers or users of carbon 
and tax or place restrictions on foreign goods or 
companies. 
6  See Houser et al. (2008), p. 7 noting the U.S. Department of 
Energy, Energy Information Administration, manufacturing 
Energy Consumption Survey data, for example, that energy costs 
are 21.73 percent of the value of paper pulp, 31.79 percent of 
the value of alkalies and chlorine production, 19.19 percent of 
the value of nitrogenous fertilizers, 16.58 percent of the value of 
cement production, 11.62 percent of the value of steel, and 19.83 
percent of the value of aluminum.
Application of the Carbon Tax to Imports?
The four most frequently cited rationales for 
moving beyond a tax on U.S. producers and users 
of carbon are:7
1. Competitiveness: the need to “level the playing 
field” between those domestic producers 
subject to carbon taxes that raise their costs 
and those producers elsewhere who are not 
subject to additional carbon-related costs;8
2. Transition assistance: the need to give time or 
financial assistance to energy-intensive indus-
tries to help them transition to a lower carbon 
emissions world;9
3. Leakage avoidance: the need to discourage 
carbon-intensive industries from moving out 
of the United States to countries that do not 
have taxes or caps on carbon, as such moves 
would be both damaging to the U.S. economy 
and its workers, and undermine the goal of 
reducing greenhouse gas emissions; and
7  See, for example, Werksman, J., Bradbury, J.A., and Weisher, L. 
(2009), “Trade Measures and Climate Change Policy: Searching 
for Common Ground on an Uneven Playing Field,” World 
Resources Institute Working Paper, December 2009.; and Cosbey, 
A., Dorege, S., Fisher, C., Reinaud, J., Stephenson, J., Weisher, L., 
and Wooders, P. (2012), “A Guide for the Concerned: Guid-
ance on the Elaboration and Implementation of Border Carbon 
Adjustment,” Policy Report 03, Entwined, November 2012 (p.7). 
8  The United States Senate, for example, voted 95-0 in favor 
of the Byrd-Hagel resolution, which expressed concern that 
the disparity of treatment under the Kyoto Protocol between 
developed and developing countries, and those countries that 
were signing on to the Protocol and those that were not, “could 
result in serious harm to the United States economy, including 
significant job loss, trade disadvantages, increased energy and 
consumer costs, or any combination thereof.” S. Res. No. 98, 
105th Congress (July 25, 1997). 
9  The studies on which industries would be most affected by 
requirements to reduce carbon dioxide emissions generally focus 
on the “trade-exposed, energy-intensive” sectors, with the agreed 
upon usual suspects including iron and steel, chemicals, pulp 
and paper, fertilizer, cement, aluminum, glass, and sometimes 
mining or petroleum. See Cosbey, A. (2009), Border Carbon 
Adjustment: Questions and Answers (But More of the Former), 
Background Paper, IISD, October 2009.
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4. Free riders: the need to encourage other 
countries to limit carbon emissions rather than 
benefiting from a system in which others tax or 
limit carbon usage but they do not.
Should the United States Congress enact a carbon 
tax, it is highly likely that one or more of these 
rationales, particularly that of competitiveness, 
will motivate lawmakers to apply the carbon 
tax to imports as well as domestic products and 
producers.
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Adding Complications:  
Equivalent Tax on Imports2
How other members 
of the WTO would 
respond to such a tax 
on their imports would 
likely depend quite 
significantly on how 
the tax was designed 
and whether other 
countries perceived that 
their rights under the 
WTO Agreements were 
violated.
The most likely form of this extension would be an equivalent tax imposed on imports, as this is the clearest way to “level the playing 
field” between U.S. producers and their overseas 
competitors. How other members of the WTO 
would respond to such a tax on their imports would 
likely depend quite significantly on how the tax was 
designed and whether other countries perceived 
that their rights under the WTO Agreements were 
violated. 
Internal Charge? GATT Article II versus Article III
The United States has a right under either of two 
potentially applicable provisions to assess a carbon-
related tax or a charge on imports — called for 
purposes of this article a Border Tax Adjustment 
(BTA) — provided such a BTA does not exceed 
the amount of the tax imposed on similar U.S. 
products. If the BTA were considered a “customs 
duty” or a “charge imposed on or in connection 
with importation,” then the BTA would be subject 
to the restrictions of Article II of the GATT. Article 
II generally prohibits countries from imposing 
any customs duties that exceed the amounts they 
agreed to charge in their tariff schedule, but would 
allow an import duty such as a BTA that exceeds 
these limits if it were considered to be a “charge 
equivalent to an internal tax.”10 If, on the other 
hand, the BTA were considered to be an “internal 
tax or internal charge” because it is paid, for 
example, upon resale of the product in the United 
States, then it would be subject to the restrictions in 
10  Article II:2 of the GATT provides that countries are not 
prevented from “imposing at any time on the importation of 
any product . . . a charge equivalent to an internal tax imposed 
consistently with the provisions of paragraph 2 of (GATT) 
Article III in respect of the like domestic product or in respect of 
an article from which the imported product has been manufac-
tured or produced in whole or in part.” 
Article III of the GATT. 11 Article III does not place 
any quantitative limits on “internal charges,” but 
contains the basic obligation that countries cannot 
treat imports less favorably than they treat their 
own domestic products. 
Both Article II.2 and Article III.2 permit countries 
to impose taxes or charges on imports, provided: 
1) that the BTAs are imposed on products that are 
“like” the domestic products that are subject to 
the tax in the first place; and 2) that the amount 
of the BTA imposed on the imported goods does 
not exceed the amount of the tax on the domesti-
cally produced “like” products. Because of this, 
the GATT consistency of the carbon tax BTA 
should not turn on whether the BTA is designed 
as a “customs duty” or as an “internal charge,” 
but rather on whether the BTA satisfies the two 
conditions contained within both Articles II.2 and 
III.2. It should be noted, however, that a number 
of scholars believe that the disciplines on “internal 
charges” under Article III.2 are less stringent than 
those on customs duties under Article II.2.12 
11  The criteria for distinguishing between an “import” tax or 
“ordinary customs duty” subject to Article II versus an “internal” 
tax subject to Article III was recently spelled out by the WTO’s 
Appellate Body in a case involving China’s regime for imposing 
charges on automobile parts imported into China. The Appel-
late Body found that the distinction turns on what triggers the 
obligation to pay the charge. If the obligation to pay “accrues 
because of an internal factor (e.g., because the product was 
re-sold internally or because the product was used internally), 
then it falls under Article III (para 164). If the obligation to pay 
the charge accrues at the moment of and by virtue of importa-
tion, then the charge would fall under Article II as an import 
duty (para 158). WTO Appellate Body Report, China – Measures 
Affecting Imports of Automobile Parts, WT/DS339/AB/R, 
adopted January 12, 2009. 
12  See, for example, Pauwelyn, J. (2012), “Carbon Leakage 
Measures and Border Tax Adjustments under WTO Law,” forth-
coming in Prevost, D. and Van Calster, G. (eds.), Research Hand-
book on Environment, Health, and the WTO, Edward Elgar, 2012, 
www.ssrn.com/abtract=2026879. Professor Pauwleyn argues that 
“to attract the more permissive GATT Article III, carbon taxes or 
charges on imports” should be designed to be triggered not by 
importation as such, but by the sale, distribution, or use of the 
product once imported (emphasis added) p.24. 
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The simplest and most 
likely WTO-consistent 
path for policymakers 
would be to impose a 
carbon tax on products 
— both domestic and 
imported — at the 
time of their sale, 
distribution, or transfer.
Indirect versus Direct Tax
In order to pass the first test under Article II.2 
or III.2, requiring the tax be applied only to like 
products, the country must show that: 1) the tax 
is imposed on a product (a so-called “indirect 
tax”) and not on a producer or manufacturer or 
their income (a “direct tax”); and 2) the imported 
products that are subject to the BTA are “like” the 
domestically produced products subject to the 
domestic tax. The general notion is the countries 
can offset (i.e., adjust at the border) taxes they 
charge on products — such as sales taxes, VAT 
taxes, and excise duties — if they are assessing 
similar taxes on domestically produced goods. Such 
taxes applied to both imports and domestic goods 
would simply level the competitive playing field 
between the imported and domestic product.13 It 
is equally generally accepted that direct taxes on 
income or production, such as corporate income 
taxes, Social Security taxes, payroll taxes, and prop-
erty taxes, cannot be offset or assessed on imports, 
because there is neither a way of knowing whether 
the producers of the imports bore similar costs in 
their production nor a way to allocate the direct 
taxes on producers to specific products.14 
As such, the simplest and most likely WTO-
consistent path for policymakers would be to 
impose a carbon tax on products — both domestic 
and imported — at the time of their sale, distribu-
tion, or transfer. The tax could be applied to any 
13  The WTO’s Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing 
Measures (ASCM) defines “indirect taxes” as “sales, excise, 
turnover, value added, franchise, stamp, transfer, inventory and 
equipment taxes, border taxes, and all taxes other than direct 
taxes and import charges.” GATT (January 9, 1995), Agreement 
on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, ADP/W/383, Note by 
the Secretariat, footnote 58.
14  See WTO-UNEP Report (2009), pp. 103. The WTO’s ASCM 
defines “direct taxes” as “taxes on wages, profits, interests, 
rents, royalties, and all other forms of income, and taxes on the 
ownership of property” GATT (1995). The 1975 Working Party 
on Border Tax Adjustments noted that indirect taxes could be 
adjusted at the border while direct taxes could not; this distinc-
tion was upheld in US-FSC, which ruled that the United States 
could not rebate or otherwise adjust its direct taxes.
set of consumers, ranging from a tax on fossil fuel 
producers based on the carbon content of their 
products to a tax on all businesses and consumers 
based on the carbon content of the goods that 
they buy or sell, assessed when the goods are sold. 
The more that the tax is described as and calcu-
lated based on the goods themselves and the less it 
sounds like a tax on income or ownership, the more 
likely the tax is to be considered an “indirect tax.”15 
While the amount of the tax would reflect the 
amount of carbon dioxide emitted during produc-
tion, because it would be assessed on the product 
itself, the tax should be considered an indirect tax 
fully eligible for border adjustment for imports.16 
Even if the carbon tax (and the corresponding 
15  The ASCM excludes from the definition of a subsidy the 
exemption of exported products from the payment of duties or 
taxes “borne by the like product when destined for domestic 
consumption,” thereby suggesting that the closer the tax is to a 
tax on the consumption of the good, the more likely it is to be 
considered an indirect tax that can be offset or applied at the 
border to imports. 
16  Because the ASCM definition of “indirect taxes” includes “all 
taxes other than direct taxes,” a carbon tax on products, even 
though it reflects a tax on inputs (energy) that are not physi-
cally incorporated into the final product should fall within the 
definition of an “indirect” tax, since it is not among the items 
specifically listed as “direct taxes” and is not in the nature of an 
income or wage tax. Moreover, past precedent would suggest 
that domestic taxes on inputs can be applied to imports as 
well. In both its Superfund legislation regulating hazardous 
chemical waste, and in reducing the amount of ozone-depleting 
substances that could be either produced or imported under the 
Montreal Protocol, the United States imposed a domestic tax on 
the chemicals at issue and a tax on imports of such chemicals or 
products containing or produced with such chemicals. Neither 
of these two schemes was found to violate the United States’ 
international trade obligations. The 1987 GATT panel report in 
the US-Superfund dispute permitted the application of the tax to 
imports that had used the requisite chemicals “as materials in the 
manufacture or production” of the imports, while the applica-
tion of the tax on ozone-depleting substances was not subject 
to a GATT decision. GATT Panel Report, United States-Taxes 
on Petroleum and Certain Imported Substances (“US – Super-
fund”), L/6175, adopted June 17, 1987, BISD 32S/136 at para 2.5 
and para.5.2.4. Certainly the intent of a carbon tax — to make 
carbon-intensive products more expensive, thereby creating 
incentives to reduce carbon emission — falls within the rationale 
for consideration as an “indirect” tax that can be adjusted at the 
border. It increases the price of the goods to which it attaches. 
Therefore, permitting a BTA on imports maintains trade 
neutrality between the domestically produced and the imported 
goods.
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BTA) were technically assessed to producers based 
on emissions at their production facilities rather 
than directly on the product when first sold, the 
carbon tax and BTA could be considered to be 
applied “indirectly” to products, in accordance with 
Article III:2. 
However, there may be a number of policy reasons 
why members of Congress may prefer other forms 
of a carbon tax than a tax on products — ranging 
from taxes solely on the generation of power, to 
taxes on the use, transportation, or distribution 
of fossil fuels, to a tax on producers (rather than 
their products) based on overall carbon emissions 
at their production sites. The farther policymakers 
move from a tax on products or the consumption 
of products, the murkier it becomes as to whether a 
domestically applied tax can be legally assessed on 
imports under the GATT.17 
How Much Is the Tax?
The second test under Articles II.2 and III.3 
requires the amount of the BTA to be no greater 
than the carbon tax applied to “like” domestic 
production. This test requires the careful develop-
ment of a system for setting the BTA such that 
it does not run afoul of WTO/GATT rules. For 
example, if the tax were assessed based on the 
amount of carbon dioxide emitted in the produc-
tion of a ton of steel, the U.S. government would 
have to establish a process to collect the informa-
tion needed to determine the carbon footprint of 
each ton of imported steel. This could be done, 
17  The difficulty in determining whether domestically imposed 
taxes on inputs (including energy consumption) can be imposed 
on imports relates to a number of open questions — whether 
taxes on “processes” rather than “products” can be offset at the 
border; how broadly the WTO’s Appellate Body will interpret 
the key phrases in either Article II.2 (internal taxes “in respect of 
an article from which the imported product has been manufac-
tured or produced”—and whether the interpretation of “article” 
includes energy— or Article III.2 (internal taxes . . .applied 
directly or indirectly, to like domestic products”) and whether 
a tax on the carbon dioxide emitted in its production can be 
considered an “indirect” application of a tax.
for example, by requiring imported products to be 
accompanied by a certification or labeling of the 
relevant aspects of their production process and 
related carbon emissions used in their production.18
The best system and one that would be least likely 
to raise WTO concerns would determine the 
carbon content of both domestically produced 
and imported products on a product- and plant-
specific basis.19 In the case of many traded manu-
factured products, the specific manufacturing plant, 
its energy source, and the process by which the 
product is produced substantially affect the carbon 
footprint of the product; the best assessments of 
carbon content would be at the level of a manufac-
turing facility. Steel, for example, produced in an 
electric-mini mill that gets its power from a nuclear 
plant would have a much smaller carbon footprint 
than steel produced in a blast-oxygen furnace that 
gets its power from a coal-fired plant. If all products 
— both domestic and imported — were taxed using 
the same methodology that reflects the amount 
of carbon that went into their specific production 
and that has, in that sense, become a part of that 
particular product, then application of such a BTA 
would be much less likely to run afoul of the WTO’s 
non-discrimination concerns.
However, such a system may be difficult and 
complicated to administer, particularly if both the 
18  The certification and labeling process itself would need to 
be one that does not place a greater administrative burden on 
imports than is placed on domestic producers to certify their 
level of carbon dioxide emissions.
19  What has to be avoided in determining the domestic tax 
under one methodology (such as reporting of actual carbon 
emissions on a per ton basis from a specific plant) while 
determining the amount of the BTA by a different methodology 
(such as a universally applicable benchmark). It is just this 
sort of difference in methodology that was found to constitute 
“unjustifiable discrimination” when the United States provided 
individual baseline standards for U.S. gasoline producers but 
required imports to meet a statutory baseline. See WTO Appel-
late Body Report, United States – Standards for Reformulated 
and Conventional Gasoline (“US – Gasoline”), WT/DS2/AB/R, 
adopted May 20, 1996, DSR 1996:I. 
The farther 
policymakers move 
from a tax on products 
or the consumption of 
products, the murkier it 
becomes as to whether 
a domestically applied 
tax can be legally 
assessed on imports 
under the GATT.
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tax and the BTA extend to indirect emissions (such 
as off-site generated electricity, heat or steam, or 
transport emissions).20 Moreover, any such system 
would likely need an appropriate alternative means 
to set the carbon content of an imported good if 
companies, importers, or countries were unwilling 
or unable to provide the necessary data. The 
safest alternative, from a WTO law perspective, 
would be to assume that the carbon content of the 
imported product is equal to the carbon content 
of the like product produced by the “predominant 
method of production” or even the “best available 
technology” in the United States.21 Under such a 
system, companies exporting less carbon intensive 
products than those produced by the “predomi-
nant method of production” in the United States 
still might be able to petition for recognition of 
their less carbon intensive product and thus face a 
smaller BTA if they could sufficiently demonstrate 
that the production of their particular product was 
less carbon-intensive. 
The reason that the method of determining the 
amount of the tax on the domestic product and the 
corresponding BTA is so critical goes back to one of 
the bedrock principles of the GATT: countries may 
not discriminate against imports.22 Satisfying this 
nondiscrimination principle will require a demon-
20  See Cosbey, A. et al. (2012) for a discussion of guidelines that 
could be used in determining how far a carbon tax and BTA 
could be extended and various methods for benchmarking 
carbon emissions.
21  When the United States imposed a tax on certain chemicals 
(The Superfund Act of 1986), it adopted this exact system for 
imposing a tax on imports produced with the specified chemi-
cals. A GATT panel ruling in a dispute over this tax did not 
find fault with the system of voluntary reporting backed up by 
use of data from the U.S. “predominant method of production” 
when the importer failed to provide information regarding the 
chemical inputs used in its production. US – Superfund. For a 
discussion of the practical difficulties of valuing carbon emis-
sions, see WTO-UNEP (2009), pp. 101-102.
22  Article III:2 prohibits discrimination in the form of charges 
“in excess of ” those applied to like domestic products; while 
Article II only permits charges on imports which are “equiva-
lent” to an internal tax. 
stration that the tax on the domestic product and 
its corresponding BTA were determined on a fair 
and objective basis that relates to the specific prod-
ucts being taxed and not their national origin.23 It 
also means ensuring that the amount of the BTA is 
not “in excess of ” that applied to domestic products 
under Article III:2 or is “equivalent to” the charge 
applied to domestic products under Article II:2, 
even though the amount of carbon dioxide emitted 
during their production — and consequently the 
amount of the tax or BTA assessed — may differ.24 
Some scholars would contend that any differ-
ence in the amount of tax assessed on domestic 
products compared to the BTA runs afoul of the 
WTO’s non-discrimination principle requiring that 
“like” products be treated in the same way. They 
would argue that a ton of aluminum produced 
using a low-carbon source of energy in a very 
efficient plant must be taxed in the same way as a 
ton of aluminum produced in a highly inefficient, 
high carbon emitting process since low-carbon 
aluminum is “like” high-carbon aluminum. In 
general, the WTO has determined whether prod-
ucts are “like” one another by examining their end 
use, consumer tastes and habits, and their physical 
23  Past challenges to import measures indicate that the stated 
intention of lawmakers, particularly statements that the purpose 
of a measure is to protect domestic industries, have been taken 
into account in determining that a measure violates Article III:2. 
See WTO Appellate Body Report, Canada – Certain Measures 
Concerning Periodicals (Canada-Periodicals), WT/DS31/AB/R, 
adopted July 30, 1997, DSR 1991:I. 
24  Recent cases decided under the WTO’s Technical Barriers to 
Trade (TBT) Agreement may suggest that some less favorable 
treatment or some “detrimental effect on a given imported 
product” would be tolerated provided it could be explained 
“by factors or circumstances unrelated to the foreign origin of 
the product.” Appellate Body Report, Dominican Republic — 
Measures Affecting the Importation and Sale of Cigarettes, WT/
DS302/AB/R, adopted May 19, 2005; Article 2.1 of TBT Agree-
ment does not prohibit a detrimental impact on imports where 
“such detrimental impact on imports stems exclusively from 
legitimate regulatory distinctions. ” United States – Measures 
Affecting the Production and Sale of Clove Cigarettes, WT/DS406/
AB/R, para 174; United States – Measures Concerning the Impor-
tation, Marketing, and Sale of Tuna and Tuna Products, WT/
DS381/AB/R, para 215. 
Changing Climate for Carbon Taxes 9
characteristics, along with whether they compete 
with each other. There is a general presumption 
that if products compete with each other, they are 
“like”; if they do not, then they are unlike. 
However, most WTO decisions that have found 
taxation systems to run afoul of the WTO’s non-
discrimination rules have been based on different 
tax rates applied to products that have been claimed 
to be different (e.g., Japanese sochu versus vodka) 
based on a particular definition of the product. 
Once the WTO determined, for example, that 
sochu and vodka were “like” products, the lower 
tax on sochu (which was domestically produced) 
resulted in discrimination against the higher-taxed, 
imported vodka. Here, however, the carbon tax 
and the corresponding BTA would presumably 
be the same regardless of the definition of the 
product — $20 for every ton of carbon dioxide 
emitted in its production. As such, the carbon tax is 
much more analogous to the tax found by a GATT 
panel not to violate Article III: the tax imposed 
by the United States under its Superfund Act on 
certain substances (used as inputs in the produc-
tion process of certain chemicals), where the same 
tax was applied to both domestically produced 
products and imports if they were made using the 
same inputs. Moreover, there is no evidence that 
the imposition of a flat-rate carbon tax applied to 
both U.S. products and imports would run counter 
to the overall goal of Article III, that measures 
should not be applied “so as to afford protection” 
to domestic production, since presumably there are 
both more and less efficient producers of products 
in the United States who would be paying more and 
less carbon tax depending on their level of carbon 
efficiency, just as in the importing countries.25 
The Alterative Path through Article XX
Should the WTO nonetheless find no room in 
Article II or Article III for the application of a BTA, 
either because the WTO determines that the BTA 
would treat “like” products differently by taxing, 
for example, high-carbon steel more than low-
carbon steel or that the GATT rules do not permit 
border adjustments for energy or fossil fuels since 
those items were not physically incorporated into 
the imported goods themselves, then the United 
States would be well positioned to defend the BTA 
under the general exception provision of Article 
XX of the GATT. Article XX lays out a number of 
specific instances in which WTO members may be 
exempted from GATT rules. The two exceptions of 
most relevance are paragraphs (b) and (g) of Article 
XX, which permit WTO members to adopt policies 
that are inconsistent with GATT disciplines, but 
necessary to protect human, animal, or plant life 
or health (paragraph (b)), or which relate to the 
conservation of exhaustible natural resources (para-
graph (g)). In order to justify its BTA, the United 
States would need to show: 1) that its carbon tax 
scheme along with the corresponding BTA falls 
under at least one of the two exceptions (either 
(b) or (g)) and 2) that the carbon tax/BTA system 
satisfies the introductory paragraph (the “chapeau”) 
of Article XX, which requires that the BTA not be 
applied in a manner that would constitute “a means 
25  Past cases have indicated that even if products are found to be 
“like” one another, distinctions may be drawn in the treatment 
of the products without violating Article III’s national treatment 
requirement, provided any resulting “less favorable” treatment to 
imported products can be explained by factors or circumstances 
unrelated to the foreign origin of the product. See WTO Appel-
late Body Report, European Communities – Mesaures Affecting 
Asbestos and Asbestos-Containing Products (“EC-Asbestos”), 
WT/DS135/AB/R, adopted April 5, 2001, DSR 2001: VII, 3242, 
para 100.; WTO Appellate Body Report, Dominican Republic — 
Measures Affecting the Importation and Internal Sale of Cigarettes 
(“DR – Cigarettes”), WT/DS302/AB/R, adopted May 19, 2005, 
para 96. 
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of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination between 
countries where the same conditions prevail” and is 
not “a disguised restriction on international trade.” 
Past cases would suggest that demonstrating that 
a tax on carbon emissions assessed both domes-
tically and at the border on imports would fit 
within either or both of the requirements of XX(b) 
(necessary to protect human, animal, or plant 
health) or XX(g) (relating to the conservation of 
an exhaustible natural resource).26 Policies aimed 
at reducing carbon dioxide emission could well fall 
under XX(b) as, for example, necessary to protect 
human beings from the negative consequences of 
climate change (such as flooding or sea-level rise). 
Equally, they could come under XX(g) as related to 
the conservation of the planet’s climate, or its arable 
land or livable oceans, along with certain plant and 
26  Policies that have been found to fall within the realm of 
paragraphs (b) or (g) include: 1) policies aimed at reducing the 
consumption of cigarettes, protecting dolphins, reducing risks 
to human health posed by asbestos, reducing risks to human, 
animal, and plant life, and health arising from the accumulation 
of waste tires (under (b) and 2) policies aimed at the conserva-
tion of tuna, salmon, hearing, dolphins, turtles, petroleum, and 
clean air (under (g)). WTO Appellate Body Report, Brazil – 
Measures Affecting Imports of Retreaded Tyres (“Brazil-Retreaded 
Tyres”), WT/DS332/AB/R, adopted December 17, 2007; GATT 
Panel Report, Thailand – Restrictions on Importations of and 
Internal Taxes on Cigarettes (“Thailand Cigarettes”) DS10/R, 
adopted November 7, 1990, BISD 37S/200; GATT Panel Report, 
United States – Restrictions on Imports of Tuna (“US — Tuna 
(Mexico)”), DS21/R, September 3, 1991, unadopted, BISD 
39S/155; GATT Panel Report, United States – Prohibition of 
Imports of Tuan and Tuna Products from Canada (“US – Cana-
dian Tuna”), L5198, adopted February 22, 1982, BISD 29S/91; 
GATT Panel Report, Canada – Measures Affecting Exports 
of Unprocessed Herring and Salmon (Canada — Herring and 
Salmon), L/6268, adopted March 22, 1988, BISD 35S/ 98; GATT 
Panel Report, United States – Taxes on Automobiles (“US – Taxes 
on Automobiles”), DS31/ R, October 11, 1994, unadopted; 
EC-Asbestos; US – Gasoline; and US – Shrimp. When assessing 
whether measures fall within XX(b), the test is: 1) whether the 
policy for which the provision was invoked falls within the 
range of policies designed to protect human, animal, or plant 
life or health (here, within the range of those policies designed 
to reduce carbon dioxide and 2) whether the application of the 
measure (here, the carbon tax and the BTA) to imports was 
“necessary” (here, to prevent carbon leakage). See Appellate 
Body Report on US-Gasoline, p. 16.
animal species that might disappear as a result of 
global warming.27
The harder task will be proving that the BTA meets 
the twin requirements of the chapeau (no arbitrary 
or unjustifiable discrimination between countries 
and no disguised restrictions on trade), as very 
few measures have survived scrutiny under the 
chapeau.28 Those failing measures, however, have 
included protectionist policies or protectionist 
results seeking refuge under Article XX. A carbon 
tax BTA, building on a policy that would prob-
ably create additional costs for U.S. companies in 
the short term, would likely be seen as markedly 
different. Congress could ensure this perception by 
making clear that the BTA was adopted for reasons 
relating to reducing carbon emissions, such as 
creating incentives for all producers exporting to 
the United States to lower their carbon emissions 
or preventing leakage by discouraging compa-
nies from moving outside of the United States 
just to avoid the domestic carbon tax. Congress 
could further strengthen its case by affording each 
company the opportunity to pay an individu-
ally determined tax that relates to their particular 
production process. If Congress can take these 
steps, then the BTA should clear the chapeau’s twin 
hurdles. 
27  See WTO-UNEP (2009), p. 108.
28  Of the more than a dozen cases in which countries have 
invoked Article XX to justify measures that otherwise violate 
provisions of the GATT, only two (EC-Asbestos and US-Shrimp) 
(21.5) have met the Article XX “chapeau” requirements. See 
WTO Secretariat, GATT/WTO Dispute Settlement Practice 
Relating to GATT Article XX, Paragraphs (b)(d) and (g), WTO 
Committee on Trade and Environment, WT/CTE/W/203, 
March 8, 2002.
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The problem for the 
United States will be 
that differentiation in 
the BTA based on the 
country-of-origin of the 
imports would most 
likely result in a violation 
of the GATT’s “most 
favored nation” (MFN) 
principle.
A Further Complication:  
Giving Credit Where Credit is Due? 3
Tax All Like Products Alike
When imposing a BTA, policymakers may feel compelled to take into account whether the imports come from a 
country that has already imposed its own set of 
restrictions on carbon emissions — such as the 
European Union, Australia, or New Zealand. Steel 
producers in Germany, for example, already must 
limit their greenhouse gas emissions or purchase 
emissions trading permits, effectively putting a 
price on their emissions, while steel producers in 
India do not face such restrictions. The problem 
for the United States will be that differentiation 
in the BTA based on the country-of-origin of the 
imports would most likely result in a violation of 
the GATT’s “most favored nation” (MFN) principle, 
which requires the United States to treat imports 
from all WTO members the same in terms of duties 
or fees. Such a policy of exempting some countries 
but not others from the BTA would violate Article 1 
of the GATT.29
If policymakers choose a tant pis approach, disre-
garding other countries policies, and apply the 
same BTA to all imports, then Europe and others 
could find a way to rebate to their own exporters 
the carbon tax/BTA paid to the United States for 
products sold in the United States. This approach 
raises few WTO legal issues, but may raise diplo-
matic hackles from those countries that took action 
to address climate change before the United States.
A Second Trip Down the Road to Article XX
If policymakers do attempt to take into account 
the carbon policies of other countries, then the 
United States would need to pursue an Article XX 
defense, under which it would justify its viola-
29  GATT Article I requires that any “advantage, favor, privilege, 
or immunity” granted with respect to any customs duties or 
charges to any product originating in one country “shall be 
accorded immediately and unconditionally to the like product 
originating in all other countries” who are members of the 
GATT/WTO. 
tion of the most-favored-nation principle through 
recourse again to the GATT’s General Exceptions 
for measures either necessary to protect human, 
animal, or plant life and health (XX:(b)) or relating 
to the conservation of exhaustible natural resources 
(XX(g)). In this instance, the application of the BTA 
to some countries but not to others would need 
to be justified. As noted above, past cases suggest 
that a carbon tax and accompanying BTA scheme 
would likely fall under either or both Article XX(b) 
or Article XX(g), as the requisite showing that the 
carbon tax scheme is necessary for the protection 
of human, animal, or plant life or health (XX(b)) 
or relating to the conservation of an exhaustible 
natural resource (XX(g)) should be readily demon-
strable.
The more problematic aspect of all the Article XX 
defenses has been meeting the dual requirements 
of the introductory paragraph (the “chapeau”): 1) 
that the measure is not applied in a manner that 
would constitute “a means of arbitrary or unjustifi-
able discrimination between countries where the 
same conditions prevail” and 2) is not a “disguised 
restriction on international trade.” Here, exempting 
those countries that have their own climate policies 
from the BTA would seem to fit within the first 
requirement of the chapeau, as the “same condi-
tions” do not prevail when some countries have 
controls on carbon emissions and others do not. As 
such, the “discrimination” resulting from exempting 
some countries but not others from payment of 
the BTA is neither arbitrary nor unjustified; rather 
it would be based on an assessment of what other 
countries have done to regulate and reduce green-
house gas emissions. A second type of discrimi-
nation claim might be lodged by developing and 
least-developed countries. They may contend that 
the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change 
(UNFCCC)’s principles of equity and “common 
but differentiated responsibilities” require the 
United States to give a break to those countries 
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that had very little carbon emissions in the past.30 
Exempting countries that have done less to reduce 
their carbon emission through reliance on equity or 
common but differentiated responsibilities may be 
harder to justify from a climate change perspective, 
as the exemption would not obviously be granted in 
furtherance of the goal of “conserving exhaustible 
natural resources” or “protecting human, animal, 
or plant life or health.” However, distinctions to 
lower or exempt certain poor countries from the 
BTA may also fall within the justifications that the 
“same conditions” do not prevail in those countries 
as they do in many of the larger exporter countries 
30  Article 3 of the UNFCC provides: “The Parties should protect 
the climate system for the benefit of present and future genera-
tions of humankind, on the basis of equity and in accordance 
with their common but differentiated responsibilities and 
respective capabilities. Accordingly, the developed country 
Parties should take the lead in combating climate change and the 
adverse effects thereof.”
that have not adopted their own carbon emissions 
schemes.
With respect to the disguised restriction on trade 
clause, exempting some countries from a U.S. 
import tax does not give U.S. producers an advan-
tage (in fact, it slightly harms them) and does not 
restrict trade. It simply ensures that imports pay 
some of the cost of carbon emissions if they are not 
already paying them at home. As such, provided 
that the decisions on which countries are entitled 
to exemptions or reductions in the BTA paid on 
their products are made in a fair and open process 
that objectively links the exemption to the carbon 
reduction policies in place in the exempted country, 
the exemptions should also pass muster under 
the “disguised restriction on trade” pillar of the 
chapeau.
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Without such an 
exemption, if few 
countries impose their 
own carbon taxes 
or carbon reduction 
schemes, then U.S. 
exporters would be 
at a competitive 
disadvantage.
The final fork off the simple path that policy-makers could take would be to grant some form of a rebate to U.S. producers who pay 
the domestic carbon tax but ultimately export 
their products. Without such an exemption, if few 
countries impose their own carbon taxes or carbon 
reduction schemes, then U.S. exporters would be at 
a competitive disadvantage. Here again, the simpler 
the carbon tax is, the easier it would be to rebate 
the tax on exports consistent with the WTO rules. 
A straightforward carbon tax imposed on a product 
could be rebated as an “indirect” tax when that 
product is exported, provided that the amount of 
rebate is not more than the carbon tax paid in the 
first place.31 Many would argue that the permission 
for rebating a domestically paid carbon tax once 
the product has been exported is broader than for 
31  See GATT Working Party (1980), Border Tax Adjustments, 
adopted December 2, 1970, L/3464, BSID 18S/97 – 109. 
Footnote 1 to the WTO SCM Agreement, which makes it 
clear the remission of taxes on domestic products when those 
products are exported cannot be considered a subsidy as long 
as the amount of the remission does not exceed the amount of 
the domestic tax; and item (g) of the Illustrative List of Export 
Subsidies contained in Annex I of the SCM Agreement, which 
provides that remission of taxes on exports in excess of that paid 
on the production and distribution of like products sold domes-
tically constitutes an export subsidy.
the assessment of a BTA on imports.32 Certainly 
the WTO rules on export subsidies permit a tax 
on domestically produced fossil fuels to be rebated 
when a product is exported, provided that the 
rebate is not larger than the actual tax levied on 
“like” products “when sold for domestic consump-
tion,” and many would argue that this permission 
extends to taxes on energy or fuel consump-
tion, since those taxes are levied in respect of the 
production of the goods.33 Thus, the debate on 
whether to permit rebates of domestically paid 
carbon taxes would likely focus more on political 
questions than on WTO legality.
32  See, Pauwelyn, J. (2007), U.S. Federal Climate Policy and 
Competitiveness Concerns: The Limits and Options of Interna-
tional Trade Law, Working Paper, Nicholas Institute for Envi-
ronmental Policy Solutions, Duke University, pp. 44; Hoerner, 
J.A. and Müller, F. (1996), Carbon Taxes for Climate Protection 
in a Competitive World, a paper prepared for the Swiss Federal 
Office for Foreign Economic Affairs by the Environmental 
Tax Program of the Center for Global Change, University of 
Maryland College Park, pp. 47; Hoerner, A. and Muller. G 
(1997), Using A Border Adjustment To Take The Lead On Climate 
Change Without Encouraging Runaway Shops; Lodefalk, M. and 
Storey, M. (2005), “Climate Measures and WTO Rules on Subsi-
dies,” Journal of World Trade 39:1, pp. 23-44. 
33  Footnote 61 to Annex II of the SCM Agreement provides: 
“Inputs consumed in the production process are inputs physi-
cally incorporated, energy, fuels, and oil used in the production 
process and catalysts which are consumed in the course of their 
use to obtain the exported product.”
A Final Complication: Rebates to  
U.S. Producers on Their Exports4
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A final important consideration for lawmakers as they design a carbon tax scheme is how to spend the revenues generated by such a 
system. The most likely options include:
1. Using the revenue to reduce other taxes or the 
deficit.
2. Rebating the taxes to the U.S. companies most 
affected by the carbon tax.
3. Funding programs to support the development 
of low-emissions technology in the United 
States.
4. Helping developing countries, particularly 
least-developed countries, reduce their 
greenhouse gas emissions and adapt to climate 
change.
These fiscal goals are not mutually exclusive. The 
revenues raised through a carbon tax could be 
divided amongst these various ends. 
Contributing a significant share of the revenues 
raised through the BTA toward the fourth option 
(helping developing countries respond to climate 
change) would certainly strengthen the case that 
Use of Import Tax Revenues5
the BTA does not violate WTO law. A significant 
allocation to developing country climate efforts 
would help demonstrate that the United States 
seeks to use the BTA to combat climate change 
rather than protect its own industries. More specifi-
cally, the allocation would indicate that the carbon 
tax scheme and its accompanying BTA were not 
designed to or applied as a disguised restriction on 
international trade, strengthening the case that the 
BTA would qualify for an Article XX exemption.34 
Moreover, by contributing to international efforts 
to combat climate change, the revenues from the 
BTA would further demonstrate that the BTA is 
part of a good faith effort by the United States 
to achieve an international response to climate 
change, recognizing the wider latitude given to 
actions taken pursuant to international agreements 
or efforts to reach such agreements.35 
34  See, for example, US-Shrimp (21.5), where the fact that the 
United States offered to provide technical assistance to develop 
the use of turtle excluder devices (TEDs) in third countries was 
viewed as demonstrating that the U.S. ban on shrimp imports 
caught without TEDs was not a disguised restriction on trade.
35  The WTO Appellate Body has stated its preference that 
discriminatory measures be justified or taken based on inter-
national agreements, or at least as a result good faith efforts to 
reach such agreements. US-Shrimp.
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Conclusion6
If Congress enacts a carbon tax to address climate change, streamline domestic energy policy, raise revenues, or reduce distortions in the tax 
system, it must be ready to address the competitive-
ness concerns of U.S. companies. It could do so by 
applying the same tax to imports coming into the 
United States as they apply to domestic goods in 
order to ensure that everyone competes on a level 
playing field and that everyone has the same incen-
tive to reduce their carbon footprint. To ensure that 
U.S. companies are not disadvantaged when they 
try to export their products to foreign markets, 
the carbon tax could be rebated to U.S. companies 
whenever they export the products on which the 
carbon tax was assessed.
Each of these steps is permitted under the WTO 
rules provided: 1) that the tax is designed to fall 
within the parameters of an “indirect” tax on prod-
ucts rather than a direct tax on the producers them-
selves; and 2) that any parallel taxes on imports or 
rebates on exports do not discriminate in favor of 
U.S. products. Policymakers have sufficient latitude 
within this framework to design and implement a 
carbon tax system that represents a good faith effort 
to reduce carbon emissions while encouraging 
all other countries to cut their emissions too, all 
while preserving the competitive position of U.S. 
companies. Policymakers can be bold. The WTO 
will recognize genuine climate change measures for 
what they are and is unlikely to find fault with such 
measures, provided they do not unfairly discrimi-
nate in favor of U.S. companies. 
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